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HOW CRUEL WAS ROGER DE LAURIA? 
LA WRENCE V. MOTT 
Roger de Lauria has been rightly to be one of the premier strategists 
and tacticans in naval history. For a medieval admiral he had an unu-
sually high degree of command and control of his forces and consis-
tently won victories despite being outnumbered and in tactically unfa-
vorable conditions. He was one of those rare individuals whose 
personal actions directly affected the fate of a country. Yet this bril-
liant career has had one doud over it: the persistent charge that, in 
regards to the treatment of prisoners, he was cruel to the point of 
being inhuman. Zurita in his Anales de Aragón (r562) was one of the 
first Spanish writers to indireccly make the charge with paragraph head-
ings such as Crueldad del almirante con los vencidos. This theme was 
arnplified by one of Spain's most famous authors, Don Manuel Josef 
Quintana, in Vidas de Españoles Celebres (I8Il) where he wrote, «Es las-
tima que juntase a tan grandes y bellas qualidades la dureza barbara 
que las deslucia: su corazon de tigre no perdonó jamas; y abusando 
con tal crueldad de su superioridad con los vencidos y los prisioneros, 
se hacia indigno de las victorias que conseguia.» This opinion has 
been echoed by most authors up until the present. A few, such as Fort 
i Cogul, have defended him with the somewhat questionable argu-
ment that his alleged atrocities were no worse than those committed 
in the 20th century. But all of these past discussions have not seriously 
addressed the issue: How cruel was Roger de Lauria? To answer that 
question several other questions have to be asked. How reliable are the 
sources concerning each case and were his actions within the bounda-
ries of established medievallaws and traditions concerning war? Out-
side of the few alleged incidents, what was his treatment of prisoners 
throughout his career? And finally, how does his behavior compare to 
that of his contemporaries, both allies and enemies? This paper will 
try to answer each of these in an endeavor to not only answer the 
primary question but to gain some insights into the man himself. 
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sage inaccurately states that Roger acted unilaterally when in fact 
the evidence indicates that he was acting with the full knowledge of 
the new king of Aragon, Alfons 111.4 
Front this point on the chronicle beco mes increasingly critical 
of Roger. Under the auspices of the papacy, on June 12, 1295 peace 
was signed between the Crown of Aragon and the Kingdom of 
Naples. Under the treaty Sicily was to be turned over to the papacy, 
which accommodated everyone except the Sicilians to whom the 
treaty was anathema. The Sicilians' hate for the papal authorities 
was second only to their hate for the Angevins and they urged the 
Infant Frederic, brother of King Jaume II of Aragon, to become 
king. In December of that year Frederic declared himself king of 
Sicily putting Roger in a precarious position. Roger was forced to 
choose between fighting for the Aragonese or the Sicilians. After 
trying to persuade Frederic to agree to the terms of the treaty Roger 
finally decided to stay with the Aragonese, who were now allied 
with the Angevins against the Sicilians. That Roger was now depic-
ted in the chronicle in an unfavorable light is not surprising. Not 
only had he failed to take Naples and had signed a treaty with the 
Angevins, he was now allied to the Sicilians' archenemy. In his con-
versations with Frederic just before he left the Sicilian cause, Roger 
is depicted as argumentative and abusive. 1 At the Battle of Cape 
Orlando he is depicted as so distraught with grief over the execution 
of his nephew that, not content with the fact that many Sicilians 
died in the battle, he «unjustly» executes the noble from Messina. 
Speciale spills a great deal of ink condemning Roger for this and for 
the cruelty of the executions. 6 Later, at the Battle of Ponza he is 
again vilified for taking revenge on Genoese prisoners because of the 
casualties they had inf1icted on his meno The overall picture given in 
4 Pryor, L., 1983, The naval battles of Rgoer de Lauria. Journal of Medieval His-
tory 9:204; La Mantia, G., 1908, Documenti su te relazioni del re Alfomo III di Ara-
gon con la Sicilia. Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans 2: doc. 16. 
I Speciale, book III, XIX, col. 984. 
6 Ibid, book IV, XIII, col. 1005. 
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Before reviewing rhe individual incidents which have rainred rhe 
career of Roger de Lauria, a few words are necessary concerning one 
of rhe primary sources. The single source for rhe worsr arrociries of 
which Roger is accused is rhe Historia Sicula of Nicolo Speciale. 
While Speciale, an official in rhe Sicilian government, is a generally 
reliable source for events of rhe War of rhe Sicilian Vespers, his chron-
ide has a disrinctly antagonisric rone rowards Roger de Lauria. The 
chronide initially portrays Roger in a very favorable lighr when he is 
appointed admiral of the Aragonese fleet sent ro help rhe Sicilians 
fight the Angevins. In describing Roger and Johanni de Procida, 
Speciale states that «among the Sicilians they shine forth like two 
stars in the sky».' Especiale also is reserved in his criticisn of Roger 
concerning the mass execution of French prisoners ar Barcelona after 
the Battle of Les Formigues which will be discussed later. While 
he implicates Roger indirectly in this affair, it is the Comitia Santi 
Pauli that is charged with cruelty, not Roger.' 
However, the chronide beco mes very antagonistic rowards him 
after rhe Batcle of the Counts in June, 1287. The battle had resulted in 
the capture of a large portion of the French nobility and had left 
Naples in a state of turmoil. However, Roger had his own problems. 
The pay for the crews had been long in arrears, and in order to pay 
them he signed a truce with Roberto de Artois and ransomed the 
captured nobles for large sums of money. Speciale is highly critical 
of this. In his view the city of Naples should have been seized, and 
he further writes «But instead Roger, being elated with the success 
of the war, not considering this (the taking of Naples), but con-
temptuous of nearly everything, having accepted large amo unts of 
money, then signed useless treaties with the enemy without having 
consulted with rhe king».J Besides being derogatory in tone, the pas-
I Speciale, N., 1727, Historia sicula in VII libros distributa ab anno MCCLXX-
XII usque ad annum MCCCXXXVJI, in Lodovico Antonio Muratori, 1727, Rerum 
italieum scriptores, vol. X. Milan: book I, XXV, col. 940. 
, Ibid., book II, N, col. 950. 
J Ibid., book II, XI, col. 955. 
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these last two batdes is essentially one of a cruel man whose only 
thoughts were of revenge and blood. These descriptions of Roger and 
his behavior are a far cry from those of his earlier batdes and he cer-
tainly is no longer being described as one of the «lights of the sky». 
In fact, the alleged atroceties for which Roger is vilified by Speciale 
occur after the Battle of the Counts when the chronicle becomes 
highly antagonistic towards him. This is not to argue that the events 
described by Speciale, such as the beheading of the Messina nobles, 
did not occur but the obvious bias in the chronicle does call into 
question the purported motives and the severity of the actions as-
cribed to Roger. As shown in the passage concerning the Battle of 
the Counts, Speciale correcdy stated the overall facts, but depicted 
Roger as greedy and contemptuous of the king's authority when in 
fact the evidence points to the contrary. It may well be that Roger 
de Lauria did participate in some of the more unsavory affairs that 
occurred during the War of the Sicilian Vespers, but as we will see 
the motives and reasons for his actions were far diEferent than those 
attributed to him. 
Probably the most grotesque incident occurred after the Battle 
of les Formigues in September, 1285. After decisively defeating the 
French f1eet in a night battle, Roger had saied south to Barcelona 
with thirteen captured galleys and nearly slix hundred prisoners. 
After the nobles being held for ransom were separated, rhe remaining 
prisioners met an unenviable end on reaching Barcelona. By either the 
order of King Pere III or the Comitia Santi Pauli, depending on 
whose account one uses, 300 wounded prisoners were executed by 
being tied together wih a rope and then dragged out to sea behind 
a galley. The remaining 260 prisoners, after having their eyes gouged 
out, were bound together by a rope and sent to the King of France.' 
Speciale adds that rheir right hands were also cut off8 Zurita, based on 
Speciale, states that Roger was responsible for this atrocity, and this 
7 Desclot, B., 1885, Crónica del Rey En Pere. Barcelona: chap. XCIV. 
a Speciale, book II, N, col, 950. 
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accusation was contÏnued by Quintana.9 Yet Desdot is quite dear in 
stating that it was done on the king's orders and Neocastro implies 
this as well. Since the king was present in Barcelona, it is highy un-
likely that Roger would have executed or maimed any prisoners 
witthout direct orders. Medieval law was fairly dear on this point. 
The Siete Partidas dearly state mat anything captured at sea was me pro-
perty of the crown.'O Both the jurists Giovanni de Legnano and Hen-
ri Bonet agreed that any booty or prisoners taken in battle technically 
belonged to the king and should be dealt with at his pleasure. 1I 
For Roger to have acted unilaterally wim me king present would 
have been an infringement of royal prerogative, and would have gone 
against prevailing medieval law and custom. It would have also been 
uncharacteristic of him. After the Batde of Malta in July, 1283 he held 
the captured galleys and men for the king. Again, aft:er the Batde of 
Naples in June, 1284 Roger sailed to Messina wim all of his prÏsoners 
in order to deliver them to the Infant Jaume." It seems unlikely he 
would have gone to me trouble of returning me prisoners to Barcelo-
na just to execute them wimout royal permission when his past beha-
vior indicates mat, where feasible, he left me fate of captives up to me 
crown. There can be litde doubt the men were sent to Phillip III by 
Pere III as a ramer pointed message as to what me French king could 
expect if he continued his crusade. The responsibility of Pere III for 
these executÏons is completely suppressed by later wrÏters. Bom Zurita 
and Quintana shifted blame completely to Roger and omitted any 
reference to the king. I) "Why these authors did this, particularly Quin-
tana who used Desdot's chronide, can only be guessed at. Roger de 
Lauria was not Spanish by birth, but had fled to me Aragonese court 
wim his momer from Calabria after his famer was killed by the Ange-
9 Zurita, J., 1977, Anales de la Corona de Aragón. Zaragoza: Book IV, chap. 
LXVIII; Quintana, M. J., 18n, Vidas de Españoles Célebres. Madrid: 82. 
10 Alfonso El Sabio, 1972, Las Siete Partidas. Madrid:II, XXVI, XXIX. 
II John ofLegnano, 1917, Tractus de Bello. Oxford: chap. LXI; Bonet, H., 1949, 
The Tree ofBattles, trans. by G. W . Coopland. Liverpool: N, chap. XIV. 
12 Desclot, XLII; Muntaner, R., 1860, Crónica Catalana. Barcelona: CV. 
Il . Zurita, op. cit.; Quintana, op. cito 
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vins. It may be that for both authors it was easier to shift blame on to 
a foreigner than to implicate the crown in a rather sordid affair. 
A similar incident occurred atter the Battle of Cape Orlando in 
July, 1299. The battle had been fought between the combined Ara-
gones e and Angevin fleets, and the Sicilian fleet. The battle ended in 
a stunning victory for Roger with the capture of many nobles, par-
ticularly from Messina. After the battle, Speciale states that Roger 
had the prisoners executed by either a sword in the chest, by being 
clubbed to death with an iron rod, or were beheaded. The alleged 
motive for the execurions was revenge for the execution of his nephew 
Joan de Lauria. '4 Joan had been captured earlier in the year by the 
Sicilians, and had been taken to Messina. There he was tried as a trai-
tor, and executed.'5 The problem with this explanation for the mass 
execution atter the battle is that again it has Roger acting unilaterally 
in the presence of the king. King Jaume II was with Roger at the bat-
de, and it seems inconceivable that the admiral would have executed 
any prisoners, much less nobility, without the express permission of 
the king. It is much more probable that the Messina nobility lost their 
heads for the same reason Joan de Lauria had lost his. 
All of the Sicilian nobles at the battle at one rime had sworn 
fealty to Jaume II when he was King of Sicily before he became King 
of Aragon atter the death of Pere III.,6 Jaume was still the King of 
Sicily and did not recognize the claim of his brother Frederic. This 
situation meant that any nobles who had sworn allegiance to Frede-
ric and were now fighring with the Sicilian fleet were, as far as the 
Crown of Aragon was concerned, traitors. When seen in that light it 
no surprise these men were executed. Under medievallaw these men 
had foresworn themselves, an act which was punishable by death.'7 
That King Jaume would have allowed prisoners, for whom a substan-
tial ransom could have been demanded, to be executed simply to 
'4 Speciale, book IV, XIII, col. 1005. 
'5 Ibid, book IV, X, col. 997. 
,6 Muntaner, CXLVIII. 
' 7 Bonet, IV, chap. VIII . 
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satÍsfY his admiral's lust for revenge seems highly unlikely. This inci-
dent appears to be a dear case of where Speciale has presented the 
basic facts, but then overlaid them with his own prejudices. 
The executions may have been also a matter of practicality. King 
Jaume may have feh that any money received in ransome was far out-
weighed by the potential harm the Sicilian nobles could have created 
if they were free. While by today's standards this would hardly be.a 
reason for a summary execution, under medieval law the potential 
damage a released prisoner might cause in the future was legitimate 
grounds for his execution. Giovanni de Legnano wrote, «Should 
mercy be shown to persons captured in a lawful war? We say that it 
should, unless by sparing them there is a fear of disturbance of the 
peace». The legal basis for this exception given by both Giovanni de 
Legnano and Bonet is the execution of Conradin by Charles of 
Anjou when the !atter was trying to consolidate his daim to the 
Kingdom ofNaples.'8 It is doubtful that Jaume 11 worried about legal 
technicalities when he executed the Sicilian nobles, but his reasoning 
may have been very similar to that expressed in the legal tracts. The 
men he executed were all experienced military leaders from the lar-
gest city in Sicily. He may well have decided that by killing the 
nobles he was not only giving due punishment to traitors but was 
also removing a potencial source of future problems. In any case, 
while Roger may have participated willingly in the executions, the 
reasons for them were undoubtedly different than the ones given by 
Speciale, and the uhimate responsibility for them certainly li es with 
King Jaume Il. 
The final incident where Roger is accused of mistreating his pris-
oners comes after the Battle of Ponza in June, I300. The Sicilian fleet 
was commanded by the Genoese admiral Conrad d'Oria, and was 
composed of ships from Sicily and galleys from the Ghibelline faction 
in Genoa. The battle had been a particularly hard fought one in 
which Roger's ship had been alongside d'Oriàs. According to Specia-
le, because of the casualties the Genoese crossbowmen have their eyes 
.8 Ibid., IV, chap. XIII; Legnano, chap. LXIX. 
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gouged out and their hands cut Off.19 It may well be that the high num-
ber of casual ties was the reason for this harsh reprisal, but the political 
situation at that moment suggests another possible motive. What is 
interesting in this case is that the punishment meted out to the Geno-
ese archers is the same as that given to the French prisoners sent back 
to Phillip III of France. Up to this paint in the war the Genoese gov-
erment had wavered in deciding what to do. The victory of King Fred-
eric over Angevin forces at Falconaria in October, 1299 had encourag-
ed the Ghibelline faction in Genoa and a large number had joined the 
Sicilian force. Rumors were circulating that Genoa might openly de-
clare for the Sicilian cause, which would have complicated the military 
situation for the admiral.1O It is quite possible that the Genoese cross-
bowmen were maimed for the same reason the French sailors had been, 
that of sending a pointed message to the other side, in this case to send 
a strong message to Genoa not to get involved. If Roger was simply 
seeing revenge he could have just as easily executed them and the other 
prisoners. The reason that this punishment was in.flicted on only these 
Genoese was that the other five Genoese galleys had held back during 
the battle and then fled when they saw the battle go against the Sicil-
ians. 21 In any case, what we do know is that after this battle Genoese 
participation in the war stopped and the state declared itself neutral. 22 
The above incident is the one case where Roger appears to be 
directly responsible for the mistreatment of captives, and regardless of 
the motives, it certainly shows that there was a ruthless side to the 
man. Yet by medieval standards he was quite moderate. The fate of pri-
soners of war during the 13th and 14th centuries depended on several 
factors. The most important factor determining whether a captive 
lived or died was whether he was a noble or commoner. If the prisoner 
was of the nobility then his chances of survival were relatively good, 
not because of any charity on the part of his enemies but because he 
19 Speciale, book V, XN, col. 1027. 
20 Runciman, S., 1958, The Sicilian Vespers. Cambridge: 273. 
21 Speciale, book V, XN, col. 1025. 
22 Runciman, op. cito 
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was a potential source of money. As we have seen, Roger at the Battle 
of the Counts used the ransom he received for the captured nobility to 
pay off his crews. Likewise, the prisoners who were executed or mai-
med at Barcelona were all common sailors or soldiers, any valuable 
nobles having been removed earlier. 23 In theory, the cap tor was obliga-
ted to demand only an amount which was within the means of the 
family to pay, which seems traditionally to have been one year's reve-
nue from the prisoner's estate. 24 However, this proviso was honored 
more in the breach than in facto Sometimes the prisoners were threa-
tened into promising extravagant sums and it was not unknown for a 
family to be forced into financial ruin by the amo unt of ransom 
required to extract a relative from prison.25 
If the family and friends of the captive could not or would not 
pay the demanded sum then the prisoner's position became very 
tenuous. An example of this can be seen in the fate of captives held by 
Spanish troops atter the taking of Prato in 1512: «And when someone 
was left alive, they seized him, whether he was rich or poor, for an exor-
bitant ransom, and whoever could not raise payment was 'tortured in 
the most abominable ways.»26 Another example comes from the bat-
des during the Hundred Years War between the Frisians and the allied 
forces of France, England, Holland and Hainault. Froissart rebukes 
the Frisians for refusing to ransom their men from captivity and in 
the process shows what happened to prisoners who could not buy 
their freedom: «If any prisoners were taken there no raunsome coude 
be gotten for them, for their frendes wolde nat quyte them out, but 
rather suffre them to dye in prisone.»27 What actually happened to 
prisoners often depended on the ' mood of their captors. sometimes 
pris-oners were released atter they had swom to retum at an appoin-
ted time with the ransom, as happened after the Battle of Poitiers 
23 Desclot, XCIV. 
24 Keen, M. H ., 1965, The laws ofWar in the Late MiddLe Ages. Toronto: 158. 
25 Ibid, 159 & 181. 
26 Cochrane, E. and Kirshner, J., 1986, The Renaissance. Chicago: 167. 
27 Froissart, J., 1967, Froissart's ChronicLes, The Tudor TransLations. London: 
vol. VI, 223. 
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when French noblemen were released on the promise they would 
retum by Christmas with their ransom!8 
However, a knight could expect expect no mercy if he was cap-
tured by common foot soldiers or archers. During the Battle of Crecy 
English soldiers went out and slit the throats of French noblemen 
who were laying wounded on the field. Froissart further records that 
after the battle when English soldiers found any French nobles « that 
they were ever nighe salyne, for there was none taken to mercy nor to 
raunsome, for so the Englyssmen were determined»!9 Even if a knight 
was captured by a member of the nobility, if that knight had commit-
ted some offense against the other side, or was charged with treason, 
then he could likewise expect to receive little mercy. For this very rea-
son the Count of Monfort, his brother and two cousins fought to the 
death at the Battle of Naples because they knew they would be exe-
cuted if captured.30 At the siege of Balaguer the rebellious counts and 
barons who surrendered to King Pere III fully expected to be executed 
for their treason, even though they had willingly tumed themselves 
over to the mercy of the king. 31 
For the common soldier or sailor on the defeated side the situation 
was decidedly worse. In virtually all of the land battles only nobles were 
taken prisoner. The only chance a commoner on the losing side had of 
survival was if he could run far enough from the battle so as not to be 
caught. Froissant wrote of the day aner the Batde of Crecy, «This 
mornyng thenglysshmen mette with dyverse Frenchmen, that had 
loste their way on the Saturday and had layen all nyght in the feldes, 
and wyst nat where the king nor the captayns. They were all slayne, as 
many, as were met with; and it was shewed me, that of the commons 
and men a fote of the cyties and good townes of France, ther was slayne 
foure tymes as manyas were slayne the Saturday in the great batayle.»12 
28 Ibid., vol. I, 382. 
29 Ibid., vol. I, 298-99. 
30 Muntaner, CV. 
31 Desclot, III. 
3
2 Froissart, vol. I, 303. 
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Of the Batde of Blanchtaque Froissart wrote, «They that were a fote 
coude nat flee, so that ther were slayne a great number of them. »33 
Battles at sea tende to result in the massacre of most of the com-
mon sailors and soldiers. Froissart clearly recognized the reason for this 
when he wrote of a naval battle off Flanders, «for the bayds on the see 
ar more dangerous and fierser, than the batayls by lande; for on the 
see ther is no reculyng nor fleyng; ther is no remedy but to fight, and 
to abyde fortune, and every man to shewe his prowes.» He goes on to 
note that no Normans or Frenchmen, the losers in this batde, sur-
vived.34 Similar incidents occurred during the War of the Sicilian Ves-
pers. Muntaner in describing the taking of some galleys by the Arago-
nese forces at the Battle of Naples wrote, «And then they went on 
board all the galleys; and all they found on deck were killed, except 
rhe barons and counts, those who escaped alive, who were held for the 
admiral.»35 Desclot reported that after the battle of Malta 870 Pro-
vençals had died versus 8 men in Roger's fleet, whik Muntaner states 
that only 500 Provençals survived the batde. 36 Villani reported that 
over 6,000 Sicilians died at the Battle of Capo Orlando.37 Even accep-
ring that this figure is probably inflated it would still indicate that a 
majority of the sailors and rowers died in the battle. Even surviving a 
naval battle did not guarantee safety. Two contemporaries of Roger de 
Lauria, Ramon Marquet and Berenguer Mallol, did not even bother to 
take prisoners back to Barcelona after capturing seven Franch galleys at 
Roses in Catalunya. After separating out any nobles for whom they 
could get a ransom, they simply crowded the captive sailors and rowers 
onto two galleys which they then sank with all on board.38 The Cata-
lan and Aragonese sailors knew they could expect the same treatment 
from the French. King Pere III made that clear in a speech he gave to 
33 ¡bid., vol. I, 292. 
34 ¡bid., vol. I, 147-48. 
35 Muntaner, CV. 
3
6 Desclot, XLII; Muntaner, LXXXIII. 
37 Villani, G ., Historia universalis, in Ludovico Antonio Muratori, 1727, Rerum 
italieum scriptores, vol. X. Milan: book VIII, XXIX, col. 362. 
38 Desclot, LXXXVI. 
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captured Angevin sailors whom he eventually released: «o men, you see 
well rhat I have you in my power and rhat I could do wirh you as I will 
and you know also if my men had fallen into the hands of Charles, 
which Cod forbid, he would have delivered rhem all unto dearh. »39 
Compared to rhe above examples, Roger de Lauria appears to be 
moderate, and in some cases, merciful. A.fter rhe Battle of Naples, he 
first sailed to Ischia, rhen Procida and Capri wirh rhe rowers and sailors 
he has captured from those islands. Instead of executing them or 
demanding ransom, after receiving from rhem, he not only let rhem go, 
but gave rhem dorhs as well.40 Besides this, he released rhe knights for 
whom he could get not ransom. In anorher case Roger appears to show 
a great deal of restraint. A majority of rhe 4,500 sailors and rowers cap-
tured at rhe Battle of Nicotera in 1282 were ttom Apulia and Calabria. 
King Pere III, after giving them food and money, released them but 
also warned rhem: «Now take good heed rhat you do not corne again 
to make war against me, for if I should ever capture anyone of you, I 
would cause nim to die a foul dearh.»41 Yet five years later after rhe Bat-
de of rhe Counts, Roger had rhese same men as prisoners. Under medie-
vallaw rhe !ives of rhese men should have been immediately forfeit. Ins-
tead, Roger takes rhem back to rhe Queen at Messina, where rhey are 
eventually pardoned.42 Undoubtedly, part of rhe reason for rhis leniency 
was rhat rhese men came from areas which were not only daimed by rhe 
Crown of Aragon, but which had also been ruled by the de Lauria 
farnily before it was forced to flee by rhe Angevins. The stated reason for 
rheir release was an acknowledgment by rhe Crown rhat rhey had been 
forced into service. Nevertheless, it indicates a high degree of res traint for 
. rhose times. Roger could have legally executed tehm on rhe spot but in-
stead went to rhe trouble of taking rhem all rhe way to Messina. If norh-
ing else, rhis episode shows rhat Roger tended to follow custom very do-
sely and was indined to wait for the Crown to decide rhe fate of his 
prisoners, instead of unilaterally executing rhem as implied by Speciale. 
39 Ibid, XXVI. 
4° Muntaner, CXIII. 
41 Desclot, XXVI; M untaner, LXXIV. 
4
2 Muntaner, CVI. 
HOW CRUEL WAS ROGER DE LAURlA? 91 
Omer examples show mat, while Roger could be ruthless, he also 
had a sense of duty to the commoners under him. He was constantly 
worried about the pay of his fleet and, as we have seen, was willing to 
use ransom that would normally have been his and rhe Crown's to pay 
off his crews. At the Battle of Malta he relinquished his rights to any 
booty and permitted me marines and sailors to keep any loot mey had 
caprured.43 And finally, if we do accept the account of the Genoese 
crossbowmen as given by Speciale men it shows that Roger had more 
concern for his sai!ors and rowers than most nobles, even if he ex-
pressed in a rather brutal way. Many nobles had little or no regard for 
the common soldiers underneath them. The Angevins treated their 
rowers as little better than slaves, and at me Battle of Naples literally 
drove the men into me galleys. The dassic example of the contempt 
the nobility could have for the common foot soldier is rhe Battle of 
Crecy where on seeing the Genoese recoil from the hai! of English 
arrows me French nobility rode down and kil1ed the hapless men for 
being «rascals».44 Compared to mese examples, Roger de Lauria appears 
to have had a high degree of concern for me cornrnoners under him. 
Roger could be moroughly ruthless when the situation called for 
it, as can be seen in me next two examples. However, as will be shown, 
his behavior even in these cases was better, or at the least no worse, 
than his contemporaries. Roger de Sangeneto had been caprured earlier 
by King Jaume and to obtain his release he payed homage and prom-
ised to rum over me city of Gaita his release he reneged on his prornise. 
During the following siege of Gaeta, the camp of King Jaume II 
was harassed by stones from catapults in the city. To stop the 
attacks one of the two sons of Roger de Sangeneto was brought out 
by the king, at Roger de Lauriàs urging, and placed in a cage in front 
of the king's tent. Roger is roundly condemned for this suggestion by 
bom Speciale and Quintana. Roger de Sangeneto, after deciding that 
by withholding fire he would dishonor himself, continued to fire at 
43 Jbid., LXXXIII. 
44 Froissan, vol. l, 298; Ornan, c., 1969, The Art ofWar in the Middle Ages. 
New York: vol. lI, 142. 
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the camp which eventually resulted in his son being struck and killed by 
one of the missiles.45 While it might seem to us that using a hostage in 
such a manner was cruel, based on medieval custom the lives of both 
sons were forfeit the moment Roger de Sangeneto refused to op en the 
city gates. rnterestingly, the medieval jurists Legnano and Bonet are 
both silent on the subject of hostages even though the custom of using 
hostages was widespread. The jurists discuss prisoner treatment and 
ransom extensively but completely ignore the subject of the of hos-
tages. Conrad of Antioch was released from a sentence of death by 
Charles of Anjou, not out of mercy, but because his wife held several 
important noblemen whom she threatened to kill if her husband was 
not released.46 During the Hundred Years War, when Robert Canoll 
refused to tum over his casde to the Duke of Anjou, the duke had 
three hostages brought out and beheaded in front of the casde. Sir 
Robert replied by beheading four prisoners and having their heads 
thrown over the wall. 47 The above are but two examples of a normal 
state of affairs in medieval Europe. What is interesting is that in the 
case of the siege of Gaeta neither of the hostages was summarily exe-
cuted, and even after King Jaume was forced to lift the siege the sur-
viving son was not killed. 
The sacking of towns and cities was how commanders, like Roger 
de Lauria, made their living. The spoils were how they financed their 
expeditions and paid their meno rf the town was taken in a siege then, 
by medieval custom, the lives of all the inhabitants were forfeit. The 
reasoning was that the refusal of a town to op en its gates to a prince 
was an act leasa maiestas and so the pillaging of a town was viewed as 
an act of justice. While this practice was never codified in law it was 
openly stated in a number of court cases where the act of pillaging 
was defended as a coustume de la guerre.<8 During the invasion of Cata-
4 5 Neocastro, B., Historia Sicula, in Ludovico Antonio Muratori, 1727, Rerum 
italieum scriptores, vol. X. Milan: CXII, vol. II44-45; Quintana, 94-95; Speciale, 
book II, XIII, col. 956-57. 
4
6 Runciman, II5. 
47 F roissart, vol. II, 440-41. 
48 Keen, 121. 
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lunya in 1285 the French certainly followed this custom. In sacking 
che city of Elna French troops killed all of me inhabitants induding me 
women and dergy.49 They then went on to pillage and bum all the 
towns between Roses and Barcelona.5o The fall of Durham and Saint 
Severe during me Hundred Years War are but two examples of where 
the inhabitants lost their lives after a siege. 51 
Roger was certainly not above sacking a town and did so on 
numerous occasions. However, compared to his contemporaries, he 
was relatively moderate. In taking the towns of Gozo and Lipari he 
simply demanded tribute and homage from me inhabitants.5' He could 
be more ruthless when me situation called for it, such as me invasion 
of Catalunya by France. When he took me French city of Agde he or-
dered that every man between fifty and sixty years oId be executed. 
However, he also forbade that any church property be touched and 
likewise ordered mat the women of me town should not be molested 
in any way.53 Of course, the above only applied when dealing with 
Christian citi es and Roger, like his contemporaries, viewed non-Chris-
tian populations as fair game. In the case of Muslim towns, like Jerba, 
besides any booty, he also carried off many of me inhabitants as slaves.54 
According to Muntaner, Roger de Lauria always safeguarded the chur-
ches and women in the towns he sacked. While this may seem an 
embellishment by the chronider, the one accusation that has never 
been laid against Roger de Lauria is mat he allowed the desecration of 
a church or that he ordered the wholesale slaughter of the inhabitants 
of a town. Those two facts alo ne set him apart from many of the 
commanders of his era. 
In reviewing me career of Roger de Lauria certain aspects of his 
behavior stand out. In dealing wim prisoners he seems to have been 
49 Desclot, LXIX; J uan de la Peña, 1991, The Chronicle ol San Juan de la Peña. 
Univ. Pennsylvania Pr.: 79. 
50 Ibid, 80. 
51 Froissart, vol. I, 109; vol. 11, 404. 
5' Muntaner, LXXXIV, XCIII. 
53 Ibid, CLII. 
54 Ibid, CXVII. 
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rather methodical and tended to rigorously follow medieval law and 
custom. In virtually all the situations in which he was involved he 
turned over his prisoners to the crown, unlike his contemporaies such 
as Ramon Marquet and Berenguer Mallol. This includes the executions 
at Barcelona. If Roger de Lauria was as blood-thirsty for revenge against 
the French as he has been made out to be by later chroniclers then he 
could easily have pitched the hapless Frenchmen overboard. In none of 
the chronicles is there an instance where his prisoners were executed 
without royalty being present. In dealing with past or future vassals he 
could be extremely lenient even with oathbreakers. His maiming of 
the Genoese bowmen certainly appears to be a case where he had a 
specific objective in mind when he gave the orders. In his treatment 
of captured towns he also appears to have been rather lenient or at the 
least methodical. While the treatment of the people of Agde strikes us 
as extremely hard and cruel, by medieval standards, the execution of 
the males of fighting age was a sensible and legitimate response to a 
population that was a threat to Catalunya. 
This picture of a nethodical commander fits much more closely 
with his career than the one of a man given to mindless cruelty. In 
his military career Roger was always meticulous, careful and methodi-
cal. Unlike the other commanders of the day, he could never be goad-
ed into a rash decision. When in June, 1300 he was challenged by 
Conrad d'Oria to corne out ofNaples and fight, he refused because he 
judged his fleet too weak. 55 Contemporary cornrnanders, to uphold their 
honor or allay accusation of cowerdice, would have rushed out to give 
battle. The Prince of Salerno at the Battle of Naples did exactly that 
even though his father, CharIes 1, had specifically toId him to await 
the arrival of his galleys.56 Likewise, stung by accusations of cowardi-
ce, Conrad d'Oria engaged Roger at Ponza even though his position 
was tactically unfavorable. 57 There is no instance in which Roger gave 
rein to his emotions to the point of risking his men and ships. His use 
55 Speciale, book V, XIII, col. 1024. 
56 Pryor, 192 • 
57 Speciale, book V, XIV, col. 1025; Pryor, 209. 
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of night fighting and the high degree of tactical control he had over 
his men and ships all indicate that he was a rather cool and calcula-
ting individual, which conflicts with the picture of a cruel man given 
to his emotions. 
So how cruel was Roger de Lauria? By our standards, he certainly 
wasn't a fountain of mercy. That he could walk into a town and order 
me execution of a large segment of the population or order the eyes gou-
ged out of a specific group of prisoners demonstrates that he could be a 
hard man. Yet each of the instances in which he ordered or urged a harsh 
of action was done for a specific purpose. In the case of the hostages at 
Gaeta the son was placed in harrn's way for a very specific reason, to stop 
me bombardment of the camp. A more typical medieval response would 
have been to execute one of the sons and then threaten to do the same 
to the other. Similarly, the Genoese bowmen were singled out from the 
other prisoners for a specific reason. Certainly by medieval standards he 
more often than not acted with measured restraint. When he did act it 
was a specific response to a specific action or threat. If he can be accused 
of anything, it is that he was ruthessly pragmatic. 
Roger de Lauria was no better, and certainly no worse, than most 
medieval commanders in his treatment of captives. In the cases of the 
Barcelona executions and the ones at Cape Orlando it certainly appaears 
he was not even responsible. In these two cases the blame seems to 
have been shifted by later chroniclers and he certainly appears to have 
been unjustly accused. In the other incidents he was acting well within 
medievallaw and custom, and general1y with more restraint than other 
commanders or princes. If we are to judge Roger de Lauria by our own 
standards then we have to paint every other leader of that time with 
the same brush, in which case Roger would appear to be one of the les-
ser offenders. He was a man of his times who acted according to the 
prevailing laws and customs. When viewed in that context, what can 
be definitely said about him is that he certainly was not the cruel and 
bloodthirsty monster that he has been made out to be. 
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